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1. An em.pirical analysis of adverse selection 
in m.edical insurance 
1. Introduction 
The public medical insurance systems in J apan are compulsory social insur-
ance programs. There is an argument about the reason for this: private medical 
insurance systems would cause adverse selection， which might hinder the forma-
tion of an insurance market. 
Adverse selection is the phenomenon by which although those who are 
insurable know wel1 the risks they may suffer， insurers are obliged to charge 
premiums based on the assumption of an average risk， because insurers do not 
have information on the risks of insurable persons or because it incurs insurers 
too high a cost to gather such information. On the other hand， because insurable 
persons know their risks wel1， they try to take out insurance if their risks are 
higher than the average risk， because they think it wi1 be advantageous to buy 
insurance. In contrast， those who have lower risks than the average do not try 
to obtain insurance because it wi1 be disadvantageous for them to do so. As a 
result， the revenue and expenditure balance of insurance finance is disturbed. 
This situation wi1 lead either to the col1apse of insurance or to a smal1-scale 
insurance plan because of a rise of premiums. In the latter case， only those with 
high risks wi1 obtain insurance and no insurance wi1 be supplied to those having 
average risk. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection1• 
If it is desirable from the viewpoint of efficiency to offer insurance to those 
with an average risk too， itcan be justified to make it a compulsory. 
There are two preconditions for the occurrence of adverse selection. One is 
the demand-side condition whereby after weighing the risks they may run， insur-
able persons wi1 not buy an insurance plan that has too high a premium rate to 
cover their own risks. The other is the supply-side condition whereby insurers 
are unable to rate the risks of insurable persons precisely. Adverse selection 
occurs if both of these two conditions exist. To examine the mechanism of ad-
verse selection more in detail， it is required to check if the two conditions are 
actually met. No empirical study of adverse selection regarding medical insur-
ance in Japan has been conducted2• This is an attempt at an empirical study of 
adverse selection in Japan's medical insurance. Using data from a questionnaire 
study of self-employed persons， this study analyzes the relations between the 
behavior of persons joining the National Health Insurance (NHI) ， which is 
basica 
2. Data used for analyses 
First， we explain the data used for ana1yses. Although we designed the 
questionnaire sheet， the questionnaire survey itself was entrusted to Chuo Chosa 
Sha (Central Research 1ncふ Therespondents were 3，500 self-employed men 
and women aged 20 years and over sampled at randorn from the master sarnples 
of Chuo Chosa Sha， which covered 12 districts in Japan from Hok.aido to Kyu-
shu. We chose only self-employed persons because the purpose of our study was 
to analyze and examine the relations between the behavior of participation in 
pension， rnedical insurance and other social insurance plans， and the risk of 
individuals， sowe had to narrow the respondents down to this group of individu-
als among whom it was considered non-participants (more precisely， those who 
are in arrears with their Insurance prerniums) in social insurance prograrns oc-
curred mostly4. 
The survey rnethod was to mai1 the questionnaire to the respondents chosen 
and the survey was carried out frorn late February to ear1y March 1997. Of the 
3，500 persons， 1，799 retumed the questionnaire (collection ratio: 51.4%). Be-
cause the master samples classified those in a managerial position into the same 
sub-group of the self-employed， we were unable to exclude the latter persons at 
the ti皿eof mailing and excluded them on1y after collecting the questionnaire. 
Because of this， ifwe remove those in a managerial position， the number of 
samples decreases by their number. It was also found later that the employees of 
private businesses were included among respondents because some of the self-
employed persons in the master samples had changed job; so， ifwe analyze self-
employed persons on1y， the samples decrease further. 
Thus the sample size used in this study is basically 1，031， ofwhich 68% are 
males and 32% are females. By age group， 1.7% are those in their twenties， 
12.4%，those in their thirties， 22.2%， those in their forties， 23.6%， those in their 
fifties， 28.3%， those in their sixties and 11.6%， those aged 70 years and over. 
The average year1y household income is￥7，720，000 and respondents' household 
incomes ￥3 mi1ion level (￥3 mi1lion"'3.99 mi1ion)，￥4 mi1ion level (￥4 
million"'4.99 mi1ion)， and ￥5 mi1ion level (￥5 mi1ion"'5.99 mi1ion) ac-
count for over10% of the total respectively. 
3. Empirical analysis 
1n this section， the above-mentioned questionnaire data are used， first， to
analyze the relations between the behavior of participation in NH1， which is a 
compu1sory system in principle， and the risk of getting sick. Then the same 
relations are examined assuming that NH1 is not a compulsory system but an 
optionalone. Finally， the same relations are analyzed for optional private medi-
cal insurance. All of these analyses are conducted using cross-summation tables 
組 dlogit rnodels. 
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3.1. Behavior of participation in NHI and the risk of becoming sick 
3.1.1. Analysis using a cross-summation table 
Here， the relations between the behavior of participation in NH1 as it is and 
the risk of falling sick are studied. The data on the risk of diseases we use for 
this study relate to whether the respondents have a chronic disease or not. 
Table 1-1 is a cross-summation table， which shows whether the respondents 
join NH1 or not and whether they have a chronic illness or not. As is evident 
from this table， the ratio of non-participants is very low (0.5%) and almost al 
(99.5%) of the respondents take part in NHI. When the percentage of non-
participants is so small， itis impossible to analyze the relations between the 
behavior of participation and the risk of illness. Therefore， we study behavior on 
the assumption that participation in NH1 is optionaP. 
3.2. Behavior of participation and the risk of becoming sick in case 
participationin NHI is supposed to be optional 
3.2.1. Analysis using a cross-summation table 
Table 1-2 is a cross-summation table showing whether the respondents join 
NH1 or not and whether they have a chronic disease or not when it is assumed 
that NH1 is an optional system. The ratio of the respondents who intend to 
Table 1-1 Cross-summation table of whether the respondents participate in 
NHI system and whether they have a chronic disease 
Participate in NHI system Chronic disease 
No Yes Total 
No 2 3 5 
0.3% 0.8% 0.5% 
Yes 631 364 995 
99.7% 99.2% 99.5% 
Total 633 367 1000 
100% 100% 100% 
Table 1-2 Cross-summa討ontable of whether the respondents intend to 
participate in a fictitious optional NHI system and whether 
they have a chronic disease 
Intention to participate in a fictitious 
Chronic disease optional NHI system 
No Yes Total 
No 73 18 91 
11.9% 5.1% 9.4% 
Yes 540 335 875 
88.1% 94.9% 90.6% 
Total 613 353 966 100% 100% 100% 
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participate in NHI is very high at about 90%， regardless of their having a 
chronic disease， but the percentage of non-participants is higher among those 
with no chronic disease than those having such a disease. 
3.2.2. Logit analysis of participation behavior if participation泊
NHI is optional 
The analysis of the cross-summation table is unable to control the effects of 
factors other th佃 chronicdiseases on participation behavior in case NHI is an 
optional system. Therefore， a logit an叫ysisis used to control such nOIトchronic
disease factors and to estimate the impact of chronic diseases on participation 
behavior. The data to be analyzed are shown by dummy variable 0 ifthe respon-
dents have no intention to join a fictitious optional NHI system and by dummy 
variable 1 ifthey intend to take part in such NHI. The equation used for the 
estimation is the following: 
log(Pj(1-p)) =a+BX 
where p isthe probabi1ity of joining a fictitious optional NHI system， a isthe 
constant term， B is the row vector of the regression coefficient， and X is the 
column vector of the explanatory variable6• However， inNHI， those aged 70 
years and over are provided with medical benefits from the Health Service Sys-
tem for the Elderly (HSSE)， socost sharing for these elderly persons differs 
from that for younger insured persons. Thus， a logit analysis is carried out using 
two equations: one using age as the explanatory variable and the other using the 
dummy variable of HSSE. 
3.2.2.1. Logit analysis using age as the explanatory variable 
The results of the logit analysis (Table 1-3) indicate that the dummy vari-
ables for educational background using graduates from junior high schools as the 
basis al do not have any significant effect on the respondents' intention to join 
a fictitious system of optional NHI. The variables for sex and household income 
are positive， but are not significant. Thus， itcan be considered that NHI is a 
service in great demand which is purchased regardless of sex， educationallevels， 
economic conditions， etc. The variable for whether the respondents take account 
of the fear of becoming sick in the future is positive， but has no significant effect 
on their intention to take p町tin NHI. 
Age is positive and significant at the 1 % level and the probable reason for 
this is that the risk of becoming sick increases with age. The dummy variable for 
private medical insurance is also positive and significant at the 5% level; because 
those who take out private medical insurance are more risk-averse， itcan be 
considered that their intention to participate in NHI wi1 be firmer. Whether the 
respondents have a chronic disease or not is positive and significant at the 10% 
level， although its significance is small. This suggests that those having an actual 
risk of illness are more willing to join NHI and co町'espondsto the behavior of 
adverse selection as seen 世omthe demand side7• A quantitative analysis using 
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Table 1-3 Logit analysis of the probability of joining a fictitious optional NHI system 
using age as the explanatory variable 
Explanatory Variable Regression Standard Regression Coeficient CoefficIent Error /Standard Error 
Sex 0.28042 0.26512 1.05771 
Age 0.04456*帯構 0.01145 3.89084 
High SsSciohnoaol /gvroacdautiaotne a 0.11221 0.33969 0.33033 Professional/vocational school graduate 0.29551 0.50090 0.58996 
Junior coI1ege / technical junior coI1ege -0.49097 0.46015 -1.06697 
graduate 
University/graduate school graduate 0.29690 0.42150 0.70437 
Whether the respondents take out private 0.53617機* 0.25939 2.06708 
medical insurance 
Whether the respondents take account of 0.14386 0.28934 0.49719 
the fear of faIing sick in the future 
Household annual income 0.00001 0.00012 0.07893 
Whether the respondents have a chronic 0.58785本 0.30571 1.92290 
disease 
Constant -0.85558 0.74112 -1.15445 
Note:判権， .. and糟indicatesignificance at the 1， 5 and 10% levels respectively. The sample size is 884. 
the average probability of the participation of al samples (0.9) of how much the 
probabi1ity of those having a chronic disease is higher than that of those with no 
such illness results in a value of 0.052， which means that the probability of the 
participation of the former group is higher than the latter by about 5 %. 
3ム2.2. Logit analysis using the dummy of HSSE as the explanatory variable 
Next， the logit analysis is conducted using the dummy variable for HSSE 
instead of age as the explanatory variable where those aged 70 years and over are 
shown by 1 and others by O. Table 1-4 shows the outcome of the analysis. Whi1e 
the results obtained from this table are simi1ar to those received from Table 1-3， 
there are some differences: the dummy variable for the graduates from junior 
colleges and technical junior colleges is negative and significant compared to 
those for junior high school graduates， and the significance of whether the re-
spondents have a chronic disease or not increases to the 1 % leve1. This strongly 
suggests the existence of adverse selection whereby the higher the risk of disease 
the respondents have， the firmer intention to join NHI they have. The reason 
that the significance level of whether they have a chronic illness or not is low in 
the analysis of Table 1・-3is probably because age is included as the explanatory 
variable， and age partly represents the risk of disease. A quantitative analysis 
using the average probability of the participation of al samples (0.9) of how 
much higher the probability of those having a chronic diseaseis than that of 
those with no such illness results in a value of 0.076， which means that the prob-
abi1ity of the participation of the former group is higher than that of the latter 
by about 8%. 
HSSE is positive and significant， but this over1aps with the effects of age. 
Although no definite conclusion can be drawn， there may be a possibi1ity that 
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Table 1-4 Logit analysis of the probability of joining a fictitious optional NHI system 
using the dummy of HSSE as the explanatory variable 
Explanatory Variable Regression Standard Reg/rSetsa唱niodraIrCdoEefriocr ient Coefficient Error 
Sex 0.14128 0.25952 0.54441 
High schoroiaol /gvroacdautiaotn e -0.23286 0.31653 -0.73568 Professional/vocational school graduate -0.05940 0.48016 -0.12371 
Junior colege / technical ju凶orcol1ege -0.96042** 0.43653 -2.20012 
graduate 
University / graduate school graduate -0.20624 0.38925 -0.52983 
Whether the respondents take out private 0.52279市場 0.25830 2.02396 
medical insurance 
Whether the respondents take account of 0.26258 0.28451 0.92294 
the fear of faling sick in the future 
Househo!d annua! income 0.00004 0.00012 0.33700 
Whether the respondents have a chronic 0.84066車場* 0.29503 2.84944 
disease 
Whether the respondents participate in 1.12340申 0.62164 1.80715 
HSSE 
Constant 1.51466帥* 0.38167 3.96855 
Note:日本， * and • indicate significance at the 1， 5 and 10% levels respectively. The sample si~e is884. 
because of smaller cost sharing for the insured， the respondents show more wil1-
ingness to participate in NHI. 
3.3. Purchase of private medical insurance and the risk of becoming sick 
3.3.1. Analysis using a cross-summation table 
In this section the effects of whether the respondents have a chronic disease 
on their decision to purchase private medical insurance is analyzed.“Private 
medical insurance" as used here means private medical insurance products sold 
by private life insurance companies etc. 
Table 1-5 is a cross-summation table showing purchases of private medical 
insurance and whether the respondents have a chronic il1ness. Whi1e many of 
them take out private medical insurance whether or not they suffer from a 
chronic disease， those having no chronic disease show a higher ratio of purchase 
than those suffering from such illness， which is the opposite to the results of the 
Table 1-5 Cross-summation table of whether the respondents purchase private 
medical insurance and whether they have a chronic disease 
Purchase private medical insurance Chronic disease 
No Yes Tota! 
No 149 134 283 
23.8% 37.1% 28.7% 
Yes 476 227 703 
76.2% 62.9% 71.3% 
Tota! 625 361 986 100% 100% 100% 
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analysis of participation in NHI when it is supposed to be an optional system. 
3.3.2. Logit analysis of the purchasing behavior of private medical insurance 
The analysis of the cross-summation table cannot control the impact of 
factors other than whether the respondents have a chronic disease or not on the 
purchase of private medical insurance. Therefore， a logit analysis is used to 
control other factors than chronic il1ness-related ones and to evaluate the effects 
chronic i1lnesses have on the purchasing of insurance. The same equation as the 
one for the logit model referred to above is used， but because the subject of the 
analysis here is whether the respondents take out private medical insurance， p is
the probabi1ty of purchasing such insurance. Unlike the analysis of Table 1-3， 
the explanatory variable of purchasing private medical insurance is excluded in 
this analysis. 
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 1 -6. First， sex has no signifi-
cant effect on the purchasing behavior of private medical insurance， while educa聞
tional background， which uses junior high school graduates as the basis， only 
high school graduates show ，a positive significant effect. Whether or not the 
respondents take account of the fear of becoming sick in the future is positively 
significant at the 1 % level， which indicates that the more they fe町 fallingsick 
in the future， the more they tend to take out private medical insurance. This is 
probably due to the fact that private medical insurance is supplementary to its 
public counterpart (NHI) and offers benefits in the event of cancer， hospitaliza-
tion， etc.一inother words， it addresses future risk more than present risk. 
Age is negative and significant at the 1 % level， which means that the higher 
the ages of the respondents are， the less they take out private medical insurance. 
This is the opposite to the outcome of the analysis of participation in a fictitious 
optional NHI system. Whether or not the respondents suffer from a chronic 
disease is also negative and significant at the 5% level， which again is opposite 
Table 1-6 Logit analysis of the probability of purchasing private medical insurance 
Explanatory Variable Regression Standard RE/rSetsaSniodn arCd oEefriocr ient Coefficient Error 
Sex -0.08115 0.17863 -0.45426 
Age -0.03409事*車 0.00792 -4.30398 
High school graduate 0.64205牢格* 0.19505 3.29175 
Professional/vocational school graduate 0.35967 0.29830 1.20574 
Junior colege I teclmical junior colege 0.36940 0.34482 1.07131 
graduate 
Universityjgraduate school graduate 0.22364 0.26059 0.85823 
Whether the respondents take account of 0.76501事事期 0.19871 3.84995 
the fear of falJing sick in the future 
Household annual income 0.00012 0.00011 1.13537 
Whether the respondents have a chronic -0.32986市噌 0.16758 -1.96830 
disease 
Constant 1.94348機構* 0.52020 3.73605 
Note:叫" .. and • indicate significance at the 1，5 and 10% levels respectively. The sample size is 910. 
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to the behavior of participation in a fictitious optional NH1 system， suggesting 
that those having a chronic disease purchase private medical insurance products 
les than those with no such ilnes. One possible reason for these results is that 
insurers might avoid older purchasers because it is an established fact that older 
persons have a higher risk of becoming sick. 1n addition， those who intend to 
buy private medical insurance have to have a medical examination and so insur-
ers might exc1ude insurable persons having a high risk of ilnes from their cli-
ents. Thus it can be considered that， on the private medical insurance market， 
insurers can know the insurable persons' risk of becoming sick， although not so 
much as the insurable persons themselves， sothere arises neither asymmetry of 
information on such risk between insurable persons and泊surersnor adverse 
selection. Household income， an indicator of economic conditions， has a positive 
e町ecton the purchase of private medical insurance but this effect is not signifi-
cant. 
4. Conclusion 
This section summarizes the results of this study and considers the policy 
implications that can be derived from the results. First， this study produces a 
result corresponding to demanιside adverse selection in case NH1 is supposed to 
be an optional system: the higher the risk of insurable persons fal1ing sick， the 
more they intend to participate in such fictitious NHI. When participation in 
NH1 issupposed to be optiona1 rather than compulsory， insurers accept al ofthe 
persons who want to take part without sorting out insurable persons according 
to their risk of becoming sick; thus this is the same situation as the one where 
insurers have no knowledge of the insurable persons' risk of becoming sick. This 
study proves that adverse selection occurs in such a situation， however， this is not 
perfect adverse selection but rather is only partial. The quantitative size of this 
adverse selection is that the probability of taking part in NHI is higher among 
those having a risk of getting sick， which here is represented by whether the 
respondents have a chronic disease or not， th佃 amongthose who have no such 
risk by 5% to 8%. Whether this percentage has serious implications for the 
existence of the insurance system is a problem that is not so e酪Yto resolve. But 
if the figure is not negligible， it means that the argument that there is a need for 
a medical insurance system in the form of compulsory social insurance to pre-
vent the insurance system from being broken up due to adverse selection is justi-
fied in case there is asymmetry of information between insurers and insurable-
persons. 
Second， the analysis of the behavior of taking out private medical insurance 
shows a result that is inconsistent with the phenomenon of adverse selection: the 
higher the persons' risk of falling sick is， which is expressed by whether they 
have a chronic disease or not， the lower their ratio of purchasing such private 
medical insurance is. This suggests that because insurers can know the insurable 
persons' risk of getting sick， they exclude those with a higher risk from their list 
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of clients. In other words， on the private medica1 insurance market， there arises 
no asymmetry of information on the risk of becoming sick between insurable 
persons and insurers and no adverse selection takes place. Therefore， the asser-
tion that medical insurance should not be left to the private market because no 
such insurance system wi1l be established due to adverse selection wi1 lose its 
foundation. 
Summing up these two results， ifthere is asymmetry of information onothe 
insurable persons' risk of falling sick between such persons and insurers， adverse 
selection takes place， although not in a perfect form. However， inthe actual 
market for private medica1 insurance， there arises no such asymmetry of infor-
mation， sono adverse selection occurs. Therefore， itbecomes impossible to 
justify the present medical insurance system， which is a compulsory socia1 insur-
ance. Are there any good reasons for making medica1 insurance a compu1sory 
socia1 insurance? One reason is not in terms of efficiency but of equity. The 
analysis of the private medical insurance in this study indicates that if medical 
insurance is left to the private market and is made an optional system， insurers 
may sel their products on;t.y to young people and those having a low risk of 
getting sick. If this happens， there is a strong likelihood that older persons and 
those with a high possibi1ity of becoming sick wi1l be excluded from the insur-
ance market. If the need to guarantee equa1ity of access to medica1 service from 
the standpoint of public policies is socially accepted， it is desirable that everyone 
can equally be given the benefits of medical insurance， regardl儲sof the dif晶子
ence in age and risk of getting sick8• If this idea is accepted by society， a medica1 
insurance system with compulsory social insurance is justified to prevent privat怠
insurers from sel1ing their products only to low-risk purchasers and to secure for 
high-risk persons equal access to medical services. 
1. Another source of :rnoral hazard in :rnedical insurance: 
Are insurance pre:rniu:rns sunk costs? 
1. Introduction 
If insurance is introduced into medical services， a mora1 hazard may arise 
for insured persons， which wi1 increase their demand for medical services. Here 
the term “moral hazard" refers to the phenomenon whereby after taking out 
insurance， the insured's probability of causing an accident becomes higher than 
before. Two reasons have often been pointed out as the source of this moral 
hazard. One of them is that if people buy medical insurance， they become les 
carefu1 about their hea1th and so are more susceptible to diseas回， resu1ting in 
greater demand for medical services. The other is that if individuals take out 
medical insurance， they think they can obtain treatment at a lower cost and so 
their demand for medical services increases (the effect that reduced medica1 
service prices increase demand for medical services)9. 
This paper proposes a third reason for a moral hazard， which has not been 
quoted before. Its purpose is to examine the case of Japan's compulsory public 
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medical insurance systems to discover whether a moral hazard actually occurs 
from this reason. 
Our hypothesis here is this: if people obtain medical insurance， they have to 
pay premiums; as a result， some insured persons have increased demand for 
medica1舘rvicesin組組e皿ptto secure benefits proportionate to the cost of the 
premiums they pay. This is a manifestation of“10路 aversion勺thegeneralization 
that losses (that is， the costs of the premiums) from a reference position (that is， 
an initial status quo position) are systematically valued far more than commen-
surate gainslO• 
According to general economic theory， which assumes individuals behave 
rationally， ifindividuals take out medical insurance， especially compulsory pub-
lic medical insurance， the premiums they have to pay become sunk costs， that is， 
unrecoverable costs， and thus whether or not people pay medical insurance pre-
miums should have no effect on demand for medical servicesl1. The costs that 
affect demand for medical services should on1y be costs bome by the insured that 
arise each time they receive new medica1 services. 
If our hypothesis is proved correct， itwil1 provide a new explanation for a 
mora1 hazard arising in insurance and a1so disproves the general economic the-
ory based on the rationa1 behavior of individuals. In the following the author 
shows the results of our ana1yses of Japan's public medical insurance systems 
according to our hypothesis. 
2. Data used for analyses 
The data used in this paper were obtained 世oma questionnaire survey of 
self-employed persons aged 20 years and over throughout Japan. With a subsidy 
provided by the “Study Group for Economic Analysis of Social Security" of the 
Policy Planning and Eva1uation Division， Minister's Secretariat， Ministry of 
Health and Welfare， we prepared the questionnaire and Chuo Chosa Sha (Cen-
tral Research Inc.) conducted the survey. The sample size used in the analysis 
is 1，008 persons. The survey was carried out from late February to ear1y March 
1997， and inc1uded questions about various attributes of the respondents， their 
use of medical institutions and their attitude toward using these institutions. The 
questions about whether or not the responden飽 gofor treatment to medical 
institutions and how often they go to the institutions apply to the period one 
month prior to the survey date. 
In Japan， everyone has to join one of severa1 public medical insurance sys-
tems in principle. The type ofthe pub1ic medica1 insurance Japanese have differs 
according to the category of their job. Self-employed persons should join the 
National Health Insurance (NHI) and when they receive medical services， they 
bear 30% ofthe costs and NHI covers the remaining 70%12. Those aged 70 years 
and over are covered by the health service system for the elder1y and their bur-
den of costs is reduced. 
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3. Results of the analyses 
This section examines the hypothesis we put forward (that is， that some 
insured persons who pay medical insurance premiums do not regard the premi-
ums as sunk costs and increase their demand for medical services in an attempt 
to obtain benefits proportional to the costs) using the data from the above-
mentioned questionnaires returned by respondents. 
Because Japan's public medical insurance system is compulsory， inprinci-
ple， itis impossible to divide the respondents into insured and non-insured per-
sons. Because of this， we asked the insured respondents directly “Do you use 
medical institutions as often as much as possible because you pay premiums?" 
and analyzed their answers to see if different rep1ies gave statistically significant 
differences on the use of medical services， that is， whether or not they went for 
treatment to medical institutions and how often they went to the institutions. We 
discuss the impact on whether or not they go for treatment to medical institu-
tions frst and then on how often they go to the institutions. 
3.1. Effects on whether or not the respondents go for treatment to 
medical institutions 
Table I -1 is a cross summation table of the respondents' answers as to 
whether or not they use medical institutions more often because of the burden of 
medical insurance premiums they pay and whether or not they gofor treatment 
to these institutions. As of the time of the survey， 42% of al the respondents 
were going for treatment to medical institutions. The ratio of those who use 
medical institutions more often because they pay insurance premiums (55.3%) 
is higher thanthat of those who do not (32.3%). From this result it can be 
supposed that there are not a few people who do not regard medical insurance 
premiums (which should become sunk costs according to the general economic 
theory) as sunk and unrecoverable costs， and take account ofthe premiums when 
Table 11-1 Cross summation table of whether or not the respondents use medical 
institutio田 moreoften b巴causethey pay medical insurance premiums 
and whether or not they use these institutions 
Whether or not the respondents use 
Whether or not the respondents use medical institutions more often because 
they pay medical insurance premiums medical institutions 
Do not use Use Total 
Do not use more often 387 185 572 
67.7% 32.3% 100% 
Use more often 184 228 412 
44.7% 55.3% 100% 
Total 571 413 58.0% 42.0% 100% 
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deciding their medical service needs， thus increasing demand for services. But as 
the other attributes of the respondents which wi1 affect demand for medical 
services are not controlled in this cross summation table， we also carry out a 
regression analysis using al of the attributes as the explanatory variables to 
control these other attributes. 
As for the factor of whether or not the respondents use medical institutions， 
which is a dependent variable， the dummy variable 1 was used for “use medical 
institutions" and 0 for “do not use medical institutions". We analyzed this vari~ 
able using a logit model. The logit model used in our analysis is the fol1owing 
equation:. 
log(p/(1-p)) =α+BX 
where p isthe probabi1ity of using medical institutions， ais the constant term， B 
is the row vector of the regression coefficient and X is the column vector of the 
explanatory variable. The explanatory variables used in the analysis are sex 
(dummy variable for males: 0; that for females: 1)， age， educational background 
(the respondents are classified into five groups， junior high school graduates， 
high school graduates， professional/vocational school graduates， junior col1ege/ 
technical junior college graduates and university / graduate school graduates， and 
dummy variable 0 isused for junior high school graduates， 0 or 1 for other edu~ 
cational background according to the respondents' educational background)， 
whether the respondents suffer from a chronic disease (dummy variable for 
those suffering from no chronic disease: 0; that for those suffering from a 
chronic disease: 1) ，whether they use medical institutions more often because 
they pay medical insuranc~ premiums (dummy variable for those who do not use 
these institute more often: 0; that for those who do: 1) and household annual 
income13• 
The results of the analysis are summarized in Table II-2. This table shows 
that the probabi1ity of using medical institutions becomes higher at the 1 % sig-
nificance level among females than among males， among older persons than 
among younger ones and among those affected by a chronic disease than among 
healthy persons. It is also revealed that even after these attributes are controlled， 
the probabi1ity of going for treatment to medical institutions rises at the 1 % 
significance level among those who use medical institutions more often because 
they pay medical insurance premiums compared to those who do not use medical 
institutions more often. According to our calculation using the ratio of those 
who use medical institutions for al the respondents (42%)， the fact that they use 
medical institutions more often because they pay premiums raises the probability 
of using these institutions by 12.8%. From this we can confirm that a moral 
hazard does arise according to our hypothesis that some insured persons go to 
medical institutions more often in an attempt to gain benefits proportionate to 
the costs of the medical insurance premiums they have to pay. 
In J apan， asnoted above， those aged 70 years and over are covered by the 
health service system for the elderly and their burdens of 
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Table 11-2 Logit analysis of the probability of using medical institutions 
Explanatory Variable Regression Standard Marginal Effect Coefficient Error (め/oX;)
Sex 0.68501事** 0.18379 0.16686 
Age 0.02923本*ホ 0.00823 0.00712 
High schomol /gvroacdautiaotn e -0.02457 0.20655 -0.00598 
Professional/vocational school graduate 0.41906 0.30962 0.10208 
Junior college / technical junior college -0.07795 0.35908 -0.01898 
graduate 
University / graduate school graduate 0.25684 0.28050 0.06256 
Whether the respondents have a chronic 2.20144キ車場 0.17412 0.53627 
disease 
Whether the respondents use medical in- 0.52446権** 0.16467 0.12775 
stitutions more often because they pay 
medical insurance premiums 
Household annual income -0.00019 0.00012 一0.00004
Constant -3.13809事*機 0.53980 
Note:叫栴..and事 indicatesignificance at the 1，5， and 10% levels respectively. The marginal efect on 
dummy variables is the efect of changing 0 to1. The sample size is 924. 
are less as a result. To control the impact of this system on the behavior of using 
medical institutions， we make another analysis using a logit model in which the 
variable of whether or not the system applies to the respondents (dummy vari-
able for those younger than 70: 0; that for those 70 years and over: 1) is added 
to the explanatory variable. Because this variable has a correlation with age， the 
variable of age is excluded from the explanatory variable. 
Table II-3 shows the outcome of this analysis. Just as what is shown in 
Table I -2， the probabi1ty of using medical institutions increases at the 1 % 
significance level among females and among those suffering from a chronic 
Table 11-3 Logit analysis of the probability of using medical institutions 
Explanatory Variable Regression Standard Ma(rg6 inal Effect Coefficient Error め/oX;)
Sex 0.59770辛料 0.17941 0.14559 
High SsSciohnoaol /gvroacdautiaotn e -0.16473 0.20075 -0.04012 Professional/vocational school graduate 0.26563 0.30268 0.06470 
Junior college / technical junior college -0.37060 0.35004 -0.00902 
graduate 
University / graduate school graduate -0.01556 0.26183 -0.00379 
Whether the respondents have a chronic 2.34296本** 0.17106 0.57074 
disease 
Whether the respondents use medical in・ 0.55937*'ホ 0.16364 0.13626 
stitutions more often because they pay 
medical insurance premiums 
Household annual income 一0.00018 0.00012 -0.00004 
Whether the respondents are covered by 0.71754** 0.29536 0.17479 
the health service system for the elderly 
Constant -1.52326車*事 0.21717 
」一ーー
Note: 事跡事..and市indicatesignificance at the 1， 5， and 10% levels respectively. The marginal efect on 
dummy variables is the efect of changing 0 to1. The sample size is 924. 
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disease. The newly added explanatory variable， whether or not the respondents 
are covered by the health service system for the elderly， raises the probability of 
using medical institutions at the 5 % significance level. The probable reasons 
inc1ude a price effect resulting from reduced burdens of medical costs provided 
by the system and the age effect of the fact that the system is applicable to those 
aged 70 years and over. 
As with the results shown in Table 11-2， the effect of the variable， whether 
the respondents use medical institutions roore often because they pay medical 
insurance premiums， on the probabi1ity of going for treatment to medical institu-
tions is positive and significant at the 1 % level. Here again we can confirm that 
a moral hazard occurs based on our hypothesis. 
3.2. Effects on the frequency of using medical institutions 
Then we analyze the effects of the factor， whether or not the respondents 
use medical institutions more often because they pay medical insurance premi-
ums， on the frequency of using these institutions. Here we use a multiple regres-
sion analysis. While our dependent variable in this analysis is the frequency of 
going to medical institutions for treatment， we use the same explanatory vari-
ables as those used for Tables 11-2 and 11-3. The resu1ts ofthis analysis using the 
OLS method are shown in Tables 11-4 and 11-5. 
Table 11-4 indicates that the frequency of using medical institutions rises at 
the 10% significance level for females and that it increases at the 1% signifi-
cance leve1 for older persons and for those suffering froma chronic disease. The 
effect of the variable， whether or not the respondents use medical institutions 
more often because they pay premiums， on the frequency of going for treatment 
to these institutions is positive and significant at the 5% level， which suggests 
Table 11-4 Multiple regression analysis of the frequency of going to medical institutions 
for treatment 
Explanatory Variable Regression Standard t.・valueCoefficient Error 
Sex 0.20751キ 0.12312 1.685 
Age 0.01517*** 0.00551 2.754 
High school graduate 0.16324 0.14205 1.149 
Professional/vocational school graduate 0.22781 0.21539 1.058 
Junior college/technical junior college gradu- -0.07102 0.24350 -0.292 
ate 
University / graduate school graduate 0.15304 0.19050 0.803 
Whether the respondents have a chronic dis- 1.37562ホ** 0.12380 11.11 
ease 
Whether the respondents use medical institu欄 0.26832** 0.11579 2.317 
tions more often because they pay medical in-
surance premlUms 
Hous巴holdannual income -0.00005 0.00005 -1.090 
Constant -0.65453* 0.34747 -1.884 一Note: "'， * and * il1dicate significance at the 1， 5， and 10% leve1s respectively. Thc sampIe size is 924. 
The adjusted R" is0.172. 
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Table 11-5 Multiple regression analysis of the frequency of going to medical institutions 
for treatment 
Explanatory Variable Regression Standard t-value Coefficient Error 
Sex 0.14021 0.12205 1.149 
High school graduate 0.05044 0.13806 0.365 
Professional/vocational school graduate 0.12778 0.21338 0.599 
Junior collegejtechnical junior college gradル 0.22364 0.23807 0.939 
ate 
University j graduate school graduate -0.04021 0.17982 0.224 
Whether the respondents have a chronic dis- 1.47275**本 0.11932 12.342 
ease 
Whether the respondents use medical institu- 0.31667判* 0.11569 2.737 
tions more often because they pay medical 
msurance premlUms 
Household annual income -0.00005 0.00005 一0.991
Whether the respondents are covered by the 0.03534 0.19670 0.180 
health service system for the elderly 
Constant 0.21958 0.14084 1.559 
Note:叫"* and • I1dicate significance at the !， 5， and 10% !evels respectively. The samplc sizc is 924. 
The adjusted R' is0.165. 
that those who use medical institutions more often because they pay premiums 
go to the institutions for treatment more often. Quantitatively， the effect that 
more positive use of institutions because of the burdens of premium costs in-
creases the frequency is 0.268. Because the average frequency of al the samples 
(for the month studied) is 0.937， the ratio of the occurrence of a moral hazard 
evaluated using the average is 28%. From this result we can confirm that a 
moral hazard arises according to our hypothesis that as people have to pay pre同
miums if they take out medical insurance， some insured persons go to medical 
institutions more often inan attempt to secure medical services proportional to 
the cost of premiums. 
Table II-5 shows the outcome of the analysis using the application of the 
health service system for the elder1y as an explanatory variable instead of age. 
Although the number of significant variables is fewer than that in Table II-4， the 
variable of whether or not the respondents use medical institutions more often 
because they pay premiums remains significant at the 1 % level. From this out-
come it can be considered that the occurrence of a moral hazard based on our 
hypothesis has sufficient grounds. 
4. Conclusion 
Our empirical analyses reveal that some not negligible part (but not all) of 
the insured begin to go for treatment to medical institutions and increase the 
frequency of going to the institutions in an attempt to get benefits proportional 
to the cost of premiums， because they have to pay the premiums once they join 
a medical insurance plan. This is a manifestation of “loss aversion"， the generali-
zation that losses (th叫 is，the costs of premiums) from a reference position (that 
is， an initial status quo position) are systematicalIy valued far more than com-
mensurate gains. This explanation of the occurrence of a moral hazard which 
suggests that some insured persons do not regard medica1 insurance premiums， 
which are unrecoverable by nature， assunk costs and contribute to an increase 
in demand for medical services is the one which has never been offered as the 
explanation of the moral hazard arising from insurance. 
According to the general economic theory， which assumes the rational be-
havior by individuals， the premiums of a medical insurance plan， especially a 
compu1sory public medica1 insurance plan， which the insured have tοpay， be・
come unrecoverable sunk co由. Because of this， whether individua1s pay these 
premiums or not shou1d have no effect on demand for medical services. There-
fore， the outcome of our empirica1 analyses suggests that actua1 humans do not 
a1ways act according to the assumption of the general economic theory and that 
there is a need to reconstruct traditional economic theory based on actual behav-
lor. 
Footnotes 
1 For a theoretica1 ana1ysis of adverse selection， see Rothschi1d and Stiglitz (1976) 
and Sakai (1982). 
2 In their empirica1 study on adverse sel即tionin the U.S.， Marquis and Phelps 
(1987) discovered that if the exp田tedmedica1 cost is higher， demand for supple-
mentary medical insurance grows. Wolfe and Goddeeris(1991) found that evi-
dence of adverse selection in the Medigap insurance market， but its magnitude is 
unlikely to create serious efficiency problems. 
3 1n Japan， everyone has to join one of several public medical insurance systems in 
principle. The type of the public medical insurance Japanese have differs accord幽
ing to the category of their job. Selιemployed persons should join the National 
Health 1nsurance (NH1) and when they receive medical services， they bear 30% 
of the costs and NH1 covers the remaining 70%. The premiums of the Nationa1 
Hea1th 1nsurance differ from municipa1ity to municipa1ity. The average premium 
per household in 1995， which is the latest one available， isabout ￥146，000. 
Those aged 70 years and over are covered by the hea1th service system for the 
elder1y and their burden of costs is reduced. 
4 Because al employees have their social insurance premiums deducted at source 
from their sa1aries together with income tax， they cause no non-participation 
problem in principle. But， inthe case of the selιemployed， they pay their social 
insurance premiums by themselves， sothere have been cases in which those who 
do not want to join a public medical insurance system for some reason may refuse 
to pay their premiums， r凶u1tingin non-participation in the public system. 
5 1n this study， the respondents who do not take p町tin NH1 number only five of 
the 1，000 who responded to the qu悶，tionsrelated to Table 1-1， a cross-summation 
table， sothe author did not examine the relations between the behavior of these 
non-participants and their risk of becoming sick. To perform this examination， 
additional studies are required using a larger sample size. 
6 The explanatory variables and their input data used in the logit analyses are as 
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follows: dummy variables 0 for males and 1 for females; actual ages of the respon・
dents; dummy variables 0 for graduates from junior high schools and 0 or 1 for 
the other four groups (graduates from high schools， those from technical and 
vocational schools， those from junior colleges and technical junior colleges， and 
those from universities and graduate schools) according to the respondent's 
group; dummy variables 0 for those not purchasing private medical insurance and 
1 for those who take out such insurance; dummy variables 0 for those who do not 
take account of the fear of fal1ing sick in the future and 1 for those who do; 
dummy variables 0 for those having no chronic disease and 1 for those with such 
i1lness; and dummy variables 0 for those who do not participate in HSSE (those 
aged 69 years and below) and 1 for those who do (those aged 70 years and over). 
Because th巴questionin the questionnaire on household income divides the in-
come groups in units of one million yen， we use the value in the middle of each 
group as data for the analysis. Respondents having an income of￥15 million or 
more (the highest income group) are asked to enter their actual income amount 
rather than checking the appropriate column， sofor these respondents we use the 
figures they enter as they町e.
7 According to the logit analysis shown in Table 1-3， where the factor of whether 
the respondents take account of the fear of g巴ttingsick in the future is excluded， 
the factor of chronic disease is positive and significant at the 5% level. 
8 Tokita (1995) argues that the medical insurance system in Japan adopting a social 
insurance method guarantees equality of access to medical service， which inturn 
leads to good health performance in Japan. 
9 For moral hazard， see Pauly (1986) and Stiglitz (1988). 
10 See Thaler (1980)， Tversky and Kahneman (1991)， Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979). 
1 There are several studies on experiments showing that contrary to the assumption 
of traditional economic theories， sunk costs affect the subsequent behavior of 
individuals. For more details， see Arkes and Blumer (1985) and Phi1ips， Battalio 
and Kogut (1991). 
12 The premiums of the National Health Insurance differ from municipality to 
municipality. The average premium per household in 1995， which is the lat巴stone 
avai1able， isabout ￥146，000. 
13 Because the question in the questionnaire on household annual income divides 
income groups in units of one million yen， we 
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